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ABSTRACT: My paper is conceived as a critical contribution to this growing literature, intended 
to clarify certain problematic controversies in the philosophy of nature.  In particular, I will 
analyze the ontological project Roberto Unger and Lee Smolin who have developed the most 
systematic philosophy in the continental tradition, and who draw on mathematics and science as 
a source of philosophical inspiration.  While I admire the philosophy of nature developed by 
Unger and Smolin, this paper will argue that their project has not been entirely succesful.  I will 
conclude by suggesting that Schelling offers more valuable philosophical resources to develop a 
cogent philosophy of nature. 
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INTRODUCTION: RENEWED INTEREST IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
NATURE 
The new millennium has been marked by a return to systematic ambition in philosophy.  
As is well known, the latter half of the 20th century was marked by the development of 
numerous skeptical philosophies,1 both in the continental and analytical traditions.2 
                                                             
1 Following Badiou, I will characterize these as various iterations of democratic materialism. See Alain 
Badiou. Logics of Worlds: Being and Event II, trans.  Alberto Toscano. (London: Continuum, 2009), 1. 
2 Richard Rorty being a paradigmatic representative.  See Richard Rorty. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. 
(New Jersey: Princeton Paperback, 1979). In the realm of political philosophy, this same gesture was 
repeated in the turn from the metaphysical to the political carried out, ironically, by the most systematic 
philosopher John Rawls.  See John Rawls. Political Liberalism: With A New Introduction and the Reply to Habermas. 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) 
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However, a growing number of serious thinkers3 chose to eschew the skepticism of post-
modern democratic materialism and once more engage in rigorous system building and 
metaphysical speculation. Intriguingly, many of these thinkers have bucked continental 
philosophy’s traditional focus on the humanities as a source of inspiration, and begun to 
take seriously the questions posed by developments in the sciences and mathematics.4 
My paper is conceived as a critical contribution to this growing literature, intended 
to clarify certain problematic controversies in the philosophy of nature.  In particular, I 
will analyze the proposal Roberto Unger and Lee Smolin,5 who have developed the most 
systematic philosophy of nature in some time, and who draw heavily on physics as a 
source of philosophical inspiration.  
While there is much to admire in their philosophy of nature, this paper will argue 
that Unger and Smolin’s have not developed an entirely successful philosophy of nature.  
I believe that the reason their project is not entirely successful lies in how Unger and 
Smolin interpret mathematics, especially the infinite.  Roberto Unger and Lee Smolin 
rightly demand that a philosophy of nature make empirically testable claims which can 
be checked against referents in the physical sciences. It is only through such a genuinely 
scientific process that a continental ontology can assume the rigour and plausibility 
required to warrant widespread acceptance. However, I argue that Unger and Smolin 
are too quick to turn to a heuristic account of the infinite, and indeed mathematics as a 
whole.  Their project advances too fundamentally anti-Platonic an agenda. They do not 
recognize how a rigorous mathematical concept of the infinite is necessary if we are to 
understand complex phenomena such as consciousness and if we are to think through 
philosophically perplexing features of nature.6   
In the concluding sections, I will briefly offer some constructive remarks about how 
these limitations in Smolin and Unger’s project can be overcome.  Specifically, I will 
                                                             
3 Slavoj Zizek, Giorgio Agamben, Simon Critchley, and Badiou himself are just a few examples. 
4 An exhaustive list would be impossible. I can mention the work of Peter Sloterdijk, who draws heavily on 
the history of biology, and Quentin Meillasoux, who has followed Badiou in being heavily inspired by 
mathematics, as just two prominent examples. 
5 I am primarily drawing upon their joint manuscript.  See Roberto Unger and Lee Smolin. The Singular 
Universe and the Reality of Time: A Proposal in Natural Philosophy. (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 
2014).  I will also draw upon each author’s additional writings where doing so might provide exegetical or 
comparative insight.   
6 Interestingly, I believe that Unger has strayed from some of his original insights about how consciousness 
itself can be understood as a kind of infinite structure.  I shall not engage this issue in any depth here.  But 
the reader is encouraged to look at Roberto Unger. Passion: An Essay on Personality. (London: The Free Press, 
1986) 
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argue that the early Schelling offers7 many philosophical resources to develop a modern 
and robust philosophy of nature.8  I will therefore conclude this paper with a few 
preparatory remarks towards adopting a Schellingian approach to the philosophy of 
nature; albeit one that deviates from Schelling in several important respects. 
 
Part I 
ROBERTO UNGER AND LEE SMOLIN ON THE EVOLUTION OF LAWS 
AND THE REALITY OF TIME 
In this section I will outline the proposal of Roberto Unger and Lee Smolin as presented 
in their opus-  The Singular Universe and the Reality of  Time: A Proposal in Natural Philosophy.  
For the sake of edification, I will occasionally refer to their other published works.  But 
the primary focus will always be on their most recent text, as it presents the mature 
articulation of their overall proposal. 
Given the unprecedented nature of such an intense collaboration between a 
founding figure of the critical legal studies movement and a renowned physicist, it is 
worth briefly noting some autobiographical and intellectual parallels between the two 
authors. Roberto Unger began his career as an especially sharp critic of liberal legalism9, 
before moving on to engage questions in social theory,10 psychology,11 philosophy,12  
politics,13 and even religion.  In between he has also been active politically, as Minister 
of Strategic Affairs in Brazil between 2007-2009 and again starting in 2015.  Lee Smolin 
                                                             
7 This is with the qualification that many of Schelling’s now dated comments on the science of his day are 
to be discarded. I am interested only in his philosophy and how to apply it to contemporary issues. 
8 I will largely be drawing on F.W.J Schelling. System of Transcendental Idealism, trans. Peter Heath. (United 
States: University of Virginia Press, 2001) and F.W.J Schelling. First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature, 
trans. Keith R. Peterson. (New York: SUNY Press, 2004) 
9 See Roberto Mangabeira Unger. Knowledge and Politics. (New York: The Free Press, 1975) and Roberto 
Mangabeira Unger. The Critical Legal Studies Movement. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983) 
10 See Roberto Mangabeira Unger. Politics Volume One: False Necessity-Anti-Necessitarian Social Theory in the Service 
of Radical Democracy. (London: Verso Books, 2004) and its companion volumes Roberto Mangabeira Unger. 
Politics Volume Two: Social Theory-Its Situation and its Task. (London: Verso Books, 2004) and Roberto 
Mangabeira Unger. Politics Volume Three: Plasticity Into Power-Comparative Historical Studies on the Institutional 
Conditions of Economic and Military Success. (London: Verso Books, 2004)  
11 See Unger, Passion 
12 See Roberto Mangabeira Unger. The Self Awakened: Pragmatism Unbound. (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2009) 
13 See Roberto Mangabeira Unger. What Should the Left Propose? (London: Verso Books, 2005) 
 MATTHEW MCMANUS 241 
received his PhD in theoretical physics from Harvard in 1979 and now works at the 
Perimeter Institute at the University of Waterloo and in the Department of Philosophy 
at the University of Toronto.  His early (and current) work focused on developing a theory 
of loop quantum gravity.14  In recent years, he has argued independently and in 
conjunction with Unger that physicists must abandon the influence of Platonism, 
particularly when understanding how physical law emerges, if we are to be better 
comprehend time itself.15  
While there might superficially appear to be little in common between the two 
figures, in fact both authors seem to have recognized the general trend towards an anti-
necessitarian metaphysics in the other’s work.  Unger was inspired early on to reject the 
mechanical determinism he perceived at the heart of both liberal legalism,16 with its 
techniques to arrive at a correct application of rules to a contextualized subject, and 
Marxism, which in its classical formulations maintained that the emergent features of a 
given social form could be understood by grasping the eternally17 operative laws of a 
materialist dialectic.18 This belief gradually evolved from guiding his approach to 
classical social theory into an entire philosophy.19  By contrast, Smolin began his career 
enamoured with the classical myth that the task of physics was conceptualizing and 
unifying the eternal laws of nature.  Later, under the influence of Darwinian theory, his 
own dissatisfaction with the incompleteness of the contemporary field, and a growing 
conviction that physicists were unduly influenced by Platonizing aesthetics,20 Smolin 
abandoned this conceit.21 Mutually influenced by each others’ work, Unger and Smolin 
collaborated to write amongst the most important and interesting proposals to emerge 
                                                             
14See Lee Smolin. Three Roads to Quantum Gravity: With a New Postscript by the Author. (Great Britain: Basic Books, 
2000)  
15 Lee Smolin. Time Reborn: From the Crisis in Physics to the Future of the Universe. (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 
2013) 
16 See Unger, Knowledge and Politics, 69-72 and Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 5-14 
17 Unger’s characterization of Marx is as a classical social theorist of the highest calibre, concerned with 
understanding the formation and decay of societies both in their particularity and in general.  He is not 
deeply concerned with Marx as the prophet of communism.  While Unger does occasionally address the 
controversial Utopianism in Marx’s vision of a post-historical society, it is not essential to his interpretation 
of the man or the tradition he founded. 
18 See Unger, Politics Volume One. 
19 See Unger, The Self Awakened 
20 Smolin’s criticism of aesthetically minded approaches to science has been developed over a 
long period. See his comments about “the power of mathematical beauty” in Lee Smolin. The 
Trouble with Physics: The Rise of String Theory, the Fall of a Science, and What Comes Next. (New York: 
Mariner, 2006), 45. 
21 See Smolin, Time Reborn, XI-XIX 
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from “natural philosophy” in some time.  
While The Singular Universe makes any number of complex arguments, the basic 
claims are very clear.  Unger and Smolin believe that physics has been stultified by its 
commitment to certain basic myths which are taken as methodological and even 
metaphysical necessities.  Amongst the most important of these is the belief that time is 
fundamentally an illusory, or at best purely subjective,22 feature of the universe.  This 
belief persists in part because many physicists ontologically privilege the eternal “laws” 
of physics over the various instantiations of those laws seen in the activity of physical 
objects.  
 By contrast, Unger and Smolin argue that physics can shift from being a calcified 
discipline engaged in Platonic mysticism23 by dealing more substantially with 
foundational issues that can only be resolved through the combined resources of science 
and speculative philosophy.  One of the reasons given for their collaboration is to 
rejuvenate the long-buried discipline of “natural philosophy” by engaging in 
metaphysical speculation on the natural world.  To do so, the physicist must 
pragmatically engage in process of reflecting upon empirical data presented and 
checking it against the most reliable metaphysical proposals available.24  This process 
helps one reach an equilibrium between metaphysics and empirical facts, and thence 
engage in sophisticated and empirically rigorous speculation about the most basic 
characteristics of the nature. Their speculations lead Unger and Smolin to several 
dramatic conclusions.  The most notable of these is that time is real, rather than an 
illusion experiences by finite beings in one part of the universe.  The second is a rejection 
of the multiple universes hypothesis that they argue became fashionable as a result of 
physicists privileging their mathematical models over empirical observations.  To Unger 
and Smolin, the universe we inhabit is the only one that is existent at any given moment 
in time.25   
My purpose here in not to deconstruct each of the varied and complex physical 
                                                             
22 Though as I shall argue, neither Unger or Smolin account substantially for the cognitive 
problems posed by time.  This is strange given that these issues were acknowledged as far back 
as Kant and arguably earlier. See Immanuel Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, ed. Vasilis Politis. 
(London: Everyman Library, 1993) and Immanuel Kant. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, ed. 
Lewis White Black. (United States: Bobbs-Merill, 1950) It is also a problem acknowledged and 
dealt with more thoroughly by other physicists.  For an instructive example see Roger Penrose. 
The Emperor’s New Mind. (England: Oxford Paperbacks, 1999). 
23 See Smolin, Time Reborn, 34 
24 See Unger and Smolin, The Singular Universe, 48 
25 See Unger and Smolin, The Singular Universe, 100-140 and 414 
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arguments given by Unger and Smolin for their all positions.  Nor will I engage 
significantly with their arguments for the singular universe and against its pluralistic 
alternatives.26  I will only touch on them to the extent their claims can be related to 
Unger and Smolin’s specific arguments for reducing the role of mathematics in physics.  
This is because my primary issue with Unger and Smolin is not the physical picture they 
draw of the universe.  Instead, it is their treatment of mathematics, and the infinite 
especially, that I wish to take issue with.   
Unger and Smolin believe that mathematical Platonism, through the work of 
Aristotle, Newton, and even Einstein,27 has far too long provided an aesthetic and 
methodological model for physics.  Platonism established a deific image of a timeless 
world of mathematical forms which has been appropriated by physics and updated into 
a belief in the eternal status of the laws of nature.  What occurs in the natural world of 
experience is only of contingent interest, whereas the operation of eternal and 
necessary28 laws are of primary importance to the physicist.  This leads many physicists, 
for instance Roger Penrose,29 to ascribe allegedly eternal physical laws a Platonic status, 
and to grant the mathematical models depicting them a consequent ontological 
priority.30  
By contrast, Unger and Smolin believe that we should look less at mathematics, and 
more to evolutionary biology and social theory as models both for how to do physics and 
for insight into how the actual universe works.31 These disciplines teach us that we must 
cease believing in the “false necessity” of eternal laws, and instead see the natural world 
of physics as analogous to the world of macro-organisms and human beings.  In these 
latter contexts, one sees no Platonic or teleological laws operating eternally.  Instead the 
                                                             
26 By contrast, we are forced to deal with their claims about the reality of time because they are central to 
the argument against the ontological status of mathematics.  
27 Saying this, Smolin is emphatic that a consistent application of Einsteinian logic would lead to the 
conclusions he argues for. See Smolin, Time Reborn. 
28 This point is especially important for Unger, who has wrestled with the concept of necessity throughout 
his academic work.  Despite this sustained engagement, as we shall see, the idea that a law could be eternal 
and contingent isn’t addressed by either author in The Singular Universe. 
29 See Roger Penrose. The Road to Reality: A Complete Guide to the Laws of the Universe. (London: Vintage Books, 
2006), 12-16.  Penrose’s own ontology is somewhat vague. He distinguishes between physical objects, mental 
objects, and Platonic objects, all of which engage in mutually constitutive relationships.  Whether there is 
any traction in this solution is a problem I leave aside.  
30 Interestingly, this gesture is comparable to the return to mathematics undertaken by Alain 
Badiou, though he has never engaged contemporary physics thoroughly enough to note this 
connection. 
31 See Unger and Smolin, The Singular Universe, 323-324 
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so-called laws of nature themselves-like organisms and humans-change through an 
evolutionary process of natural selection wherein those that are best adapted to the 
physical contexts within which they emerge.   
This suggests two important points. The first is that the universe, as we experience 
it, is the product of relational and contingent processes which lead to probabilistic 
outcomes.  Resultantly, the ontology of the universe, and indeed everything within it, is 
not a necessary outcome of eternal laws operating within what finite subjects experience 
as space-time.32  Secondly, Unger and Smolin propose that their natural philosophy 
suggests that time truly exists.  Unger and Newton argue that their predecessors were 
prone to devaluing time.  On their reading, Newton felt that time was simply a 
phenomena experienced by finite beings within the mind of God, while Einstein believed 
it was a phenomena experienced by individuals moving within a relative worldline.33  
Unger and Smolin believe these figures were attracted to this position because both 
Newton and Einstein believed that the universe must operate according to necessary, 
deterministic laws.34  This implied that time was an illusion, albeit an important one, 
since the appearance of change and transformation was undercut by the fact that 
everything was determined by natural law from the outset. By contrast, Unger and 
Smolin argue that natural laws are better understood as contingent and constantly 
evolving. This suggests that time does exist and is open ended. Since the laws of nature 
are contingent, rather than necessary, the future remains undetermined.35  
Their argument that the universe evolves through contingent processes wherein laws 
emerge and disappear, along with the consequent argument that time exists, leads in to 
                                                             
32 See Unger and Smolin, The Singular Universe, 367-372 
33 Unger and Smolin argue that these arguments constitute the spatialization of time.  It transforms time 
from an independent variable into one that can only be understood through the geometry of space-time.  
This naturally inclines physicists to understand time according to the spatial qualities associated with 
geometry since the days of Euclid. 
34 See Unger and Smolin, The Singular Universe, 32-45 
35 Notably, both Unger and Smolin believe that this has significant ramifications for our understanding of 
human agency and the human sciences. For instance, they apply their model to the “science” of economics 
to maintain the most economists are wrong to see the market as operating according to certain timeless laws 
which, under ideal conditions, would lead to a welfare maximizing equilibrium. The consequence of this 
has been to argue that we should interfere in the economy as little as possible.  Unger and Smolin both 
reject this position as unduly beholden to classical physics as a model for how to do science. Appeal to the 
false necessity of so called “laws” of path-dependent economics leads many to reject any belief that we can 
fundamentally change the socio-historical contexts within which we exist.  Unfortunately, most of these 
insights are sporadically developed and the connection between a “natural philosophy” and an ethics 
and/or politics ambiguous. The most insightful remarks have been on how physics has served as a model 
for sciences, including economics.  
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Unger and Smolin’s arguments that physicists should reject the authority typically 
ascribed to mathematics.36  This prioritization leads physicists to strip the flesh and blood 
from real occurrences. Indeed, Unger and Smolin believe that physicists engage in a 
fundamentally paradoxical activity by using the seemingly timeless laws of mathematics 
to describe the occurrences of the actual world as it exists and operates within time. This 
was nicely captured by Leopold Kronecker’s claim that, “God created the integers.  All 
the rest if the work of Man.”37 
Unger and Smolin emphatically reject this conception of mathematics being either 
transcendent or a priori to the experience acquired through engaging in everyday physics, 
and rigorous experimentation. As nicely summarized by Unger, in his brief paper on the 
topic: 
“The distinctiveness of the mathematical perspective -- its evisceration of 
particularity and its suppression of time -- helps explain the power of mathematics 
to illuminate a universe in which time holds sway and particularity is everywhere. 
This power, nevertheless, perpetually subjects us to a twofold risk. The first risk is 
to mistake the mathematical representation of a slice of the one real world -- the 
slice that has to do with bundles of relations and with structured wholes -- for 
privileged, indubitable insight into a separate, nature-transcending realm of 
mathematical truths. There is no such realm, any more than there is a multitude of 
unobservable universes (now commonly called the multiverse) whose existence we 
postulate only because they fill the otherwise empty boxes of a mathematical 
conception, disguised as a physical theory. The second risk is that we allow 
ourselves to be lulled by the effectiveness and beauty of our mathematical 
propositions into the belief that nature shares in their timelessness. It would do so, 
most convincingly, by operating under the force of eternal laws and symmetries. 
Such regularities achieve adequate expression only when they can be represented 
mathematically. Their susceptibility to mathematical representation confirms, 
according to this illusion, their claim to participate in the freedom of mathematics 
from time. It does not. To believe that it does is to spoil the gift of mathematics to 
                                                             
36 Part of this stems from their fundamental materialism.  Unger and Smolin do not give particularly strong 
epistemological reasons for rejecting cognitivist theories in favor of materialism.  But there is no doubt that 
their belief in the latter, with the associated realism about he natural world, contributes to Unger and Smolin 
reject arguments for both Platonism and other, more skeptical philosophies, that believe that mathematical 
models of the world are simply the best hook to reality that we have.  Unger calls these philosophies the two 
“families of ideas” in our philosophical understanding of mathematics. See Roberto Mangabeira Unger. 
“A Mystery Demystified: The Connection Between Mathematics and Physics” 
http://robertounger.com/english/pdfs/MATHEMATICS_AND_PHYSICS1.pdf 
37 See Stephen Hawking. God Created the Integers: The Mathematical Breakthroughs that Changed History.  
(Philadelphia: Running Press, 2007), 1058-1059. 
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physics.”38 
Unger and Smolin argue that physicists should instead adopt a pragmatic approach 
to mathematics and its relationship to physical phenomena.  Maths should be considered 
a useful tool, but not one that occupies pride of place, let alone being accorded 
ontological significance.  They regard this as both a methodological and ethical advance 
on previous, Platonically oriented positions.  When, “language is the language” of 
physics,39 it would enable individuals to engage more creatively and inclusively with the 
topic. It would also enable other voices, such as those of philosophers and even laymen, 
to join in the conversation about the most basic questions about the universe. To this 
point, Smolin himself recounts that he was initially “seduced” to the discipline of physics 
in part because of the supreme elegance and simplicity of Einstein’s writing.40 
THE INFINITE IN UNGER AND SMOLIN’S SYSTEM 
 Unger and Smolin have presented a powerful natural philosophy which, in a 
philosophical era dominated by skeptical democratic materialism, is impressively 
systematic and ambitious.  It would be impossible to fully examine all their nuanced 
arguments and positions in one paper.41  Here, I will simply be looking at how Unger 
                                                             
38 See Unger. “A Mystery Demystified,” 1. 
39 See Smolin. Time Reborn,  
40 See Smolin, Time Reborn, 54-55 
41 One of the most noteworthy areas where I can offer criticism is their attempt to deal with the paradox of 
meta-laws.  It would seem that Unger and Smolin’s argument that all laws evolve can be subjected to an 
obvious criticism.  There position seems fundamentally paradoxical, as they put it, because one might ask 
whether it is an eternal natural law that the emergence of natural laws s contingent.  To their credit, Unger 
and Smolin are aware of this difficulty, connoting it as the meta-law paradox.  Their contention is that the 
paradox becomes less significant once one accepts the Darwinian inspired fact that their approach is 
probabilistic rather than deterministic.  This suggests that there is always a causal relationship between past 
and future in a universe where time is real, but it is never so wholly determined that we are pushed back to 
assuming that time is an illusion.  As put by Unger “What we call laws of nature are the regular and 
recurrent form that causal connections take in certain states of nature or for certain periods in the history 
of the universe. It follows that we do better to think of the laws of nature as deriving from causal connections 
rather than to see the latter as deriving from the former, as we are accustomed to do. The existence of 
causality without laws is founded on the power of sequence: the influence of a before on an after. It is an 
influence exercised regardless of whether causal processes recur over a differentiated structure of reality, 
allowing us to state laws in the form of equations. The ability to express laws of nature as equations provides 
an immense benefit to scientific inquiry. By the same token, however, this practice may mislead us into 
thinking of causal connections as mere instances of laws of nature. It is, on the contrary, the laws that 
describe one of the forms, but not the only form, that causal connections take in nature: the recurrent and 
general form.” In Unger and Smolin, The Singular Universe, 281.  Unfortunately, we do not find this fully 
satisfactory.  For once, it only applies to reality at the cosmological scale without accounting for whether 
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and Smolin deepen their anti-Platonism by dismissing the need to develop a rigorous 
mathematical account of the infinite.  I believe that this is an error.  Any ontologically 
rigorous account of reality must ultimately find a way to account for the infinite, both in 
its mathematical formulations and as it appears in nature.   
Unger and Smolin take the neo-Gaussian42 position that the infinite is essentially a 
heuristic term without actual substance.  They juxtapose this against the Platonism of 
physicists such as Roger Penrose who ascribe the infinite a fundamental, but distinct, 
reality which we can only perceive but only dimly.43 While mathematicians and physicists 
might be dealing with immense and even indefinitely large quantities, they do not believe 
we should ascribe any significance to infinity beyond that required to do the practical 
work of everyday science. This applies both to cosmological phenomena such as 
singularities, which are often considered bodies of infinite mass and density, and to 
“inventions” such as Cantor’s system of transfinite numbers.44    
 I do not believe this pragmatic argument is adequate. Cantor’s development of the 
theory of transfinite numbers is not simply a novel invention with some useful 
applications. It fundamentally transforms our approach to issues where infinity is at play, 
by giving us a more analytically rigorous means of understanding these deeply ephemeral 
concepts.  Cantor's great discovery was to formulate an analytically rigorous distinction45 
between what he referred to as the potential and the absolute infinite.46  A potentially 
infinite "number" was a logical quantity which one could demonstrate had no definable 
                                                             
the same applies in mid-level tiers of reality, such as the one we human beings inhabit. This is part of the 
reason we feel a transcendental empiricism as found in Schelling is required.  At a deeper level, it also does 
not account for more basic problems about holism and reductionism, and its relationship to the necessity 
and determinism Smolin and Unger reject.  For example, I believe that Saul Kripke makes salient points in 
maintaining that its seems necessary for certain objects to have essential characteristics a posteriori for them 
to exist as what they are. The famous example is the chemical structure of water a dihydrogen monoxide.  
Whether these objections can be levelled more systematically against them is a question I leave for another 
time.  See Saul Kripke. Naming and Necessity. (Singapore: Blackwell Publishing, 1981), 128-129.  See also Arif 
Ahmed.  Saul Kripke: Contemporary American Thinkers. (New York: Continuum, 2007). 
42 Carl Gauss claimed he would “protest against using infinite magnitude as something consummated; such 
a use is never admissible in mathematics.  The infinite is a facon de parler; one has in mind limits which ratios 
approach as closely as desirable, while other ratios may increase indefinitely.”  This quote may be found in 
John D. Barrow. New Theories of Everything. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 46. 
43 See Penrose. The Road to Reality, 1028-1029. 
44 See Unger and Smolin, The Singular Universe, 440 
45 In the concluding section of the paper this distinction becomes quite important. 
46 Georg Cantor. Contributions to the Founding of the Theory of Transfinite Numbers, trans. Phillip Jourdain.  (New 
York: Dover Press, 1955) 
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limit.47 None the less, one could paradoxically also establish that there were still larger 
quantities than that potentially infinite number if it was put into one to one 
correspondence with another potentially infinite number.  This continued up to what he 
called the “Absolute infinite,” which he largely ascribed the theological qualities that 
some philosophers48 had long associated with infinity.49 
Cantor knew that he was defending logical concepts which were paradoxical and 
which upset our settled understanding.  How could a quantity that was infinite none-
the-less exist in a world with a quantity that exceeded it?  This is why he attempted to 
temper the problem and ameliorate skepticism by critics through drawing a qualitative 
distinction between what he called the potential and the Absolute infinity.50  To talk 
about a potential infinity simply involved... 
“...say[ing] that there are infinitely many objects of a certain kind ('infinitely' being 
taken in the syncategorematic sense) simply means that given any finite number of 
these objects there will be some larger number of them.”51 
I believe that Cantor hoped to ground the logic of the potential infinity in the more 
palatable argument that it was of a unique type finitude.  The potential infinity was a 
magnitude greater than any finite number that could be thought.52 In this sense, I 
consider it to be a transcendental hypothesis’ Cantor understood t that after a threshold 
these indefinite quantities take on qualitatively distinct characteristics relative to other 
numbers.  Therefore, he considered the hypothesis that there existed an absolute infinite 
to be a central to understanding the potential infinite.  After a point, one could no longer 
rely on logical analysis.  One had to engage in the transcendental task of bringing 
                                                             
47 In his earlier work Cantor preferred to characterize potentially infinite numbers as "transfinite" to avoid 
confusion.  Because the concept of potentiality has a longer history in the philosophical literature I have 
chosen to use this term instead. 
48 Schelling was no exception to this as we shall see. 
49 Jane Ignacio. “The Role of the Absolute Infinite in Cantor’s Conception of Set.” Erkenntnis 42 
(1995): 383.  The point against the “finitist response” is also made by Mary Tiles by appealing to 
the continuum problem. See Mary Tiles. The Philosophy of Set Theory: An Historical Introduction to 
Cantor’s Paradise. (New York: Dover, 1989), 64-67. 
50Some of this history, and Cantor's rivalry with Leopold Kronecker, is recounted in David Foster Wallace's 
book on infinity.  See David Foster Wallace. Everything and More: A Compact History of Infinity. (United States: 
Norton, 2003), 170.   
51 Jane Ignacio. “The Role of the Absolute Infinite in Cantor’s Conception of Set.” Erkenntnis 42 
(1995): 383. 
52 By contrast, Cantor regarded the Absolute infinity as a unity rather than just another 
magnitude and denoted it with the Omega symbol Ω.  A deeply religious man, he came to 
associate it very closely with a personalized God. 
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definite and indefinite quantities into some holistic system of understanding; both 
epistemologically53 and ontologically.54  
Unger and Smolin conceive of the infinite as essentially a heuristic term; one with 
some use but without actual substance. Their reasoning applies both to cosmological 
phenomena that have typically been understood to involve infinite quantities related to 
mass and density, and to mathematical “inventions” such as the system of transfinite 
numbers. While they offer some reasons for their position, none of them are particularly 
convincing.  Most involve simply trying to tame the infinite by suggesting that it is little 
more than a pragmatic tool that cannot be connected to any empirical object.   
This position seems rather obscure.  Firstly, it seems clear that since at least the 19th 
century the infinite cannot be conceptually pragmatized in the way Unger and Smolin 
want.  Their account might have been true of the more transcendental accounts given 
by scholars like Kant, who did indeed use the infinite in a manner akin to a heuristic 
device.  But in a post-Cantorian world, we have developed considerably more rigorous 
interpretations of the infinite and the problem of the continuum that aren’t so easily 
pushed aside.  This brings me to my second point.  Unger and Smolin might be able to 
avoid this issue if it were just a matter of mathematical interest.  But the mathematics of 
the infinite does pertain to important issues in physical theory, a point which has been 
acknowledged by other philosophically minded physicists such as Roger Penrose who 
points to its necessity when interpreting Hilbert Spaces in his book The Road to Reality.55  
This is just one example of many that could be raised, but Unger and Smolin seem largely 
disinterested in engaging this issue in a comprehensive way. 
This suggests that Unger and Smolin’s anti-mathematic disposition might be less 
steady than they claim.  Indeed, at some points Unger and Smolin’s anti-Platonism 
comes across as doctrinaire.  How this might problematize their philosophy of nature 
more generally, I leave to the reader.  To give just one example that comes to mind, it 
remains unclear to me how Unger and Smolin can successfully answer some of the 
classical cosmological antinomies, such as whether the universe had a beginning or not 
in time, without wrestling more deeply with these matters.  Determining whether the 
universe had a beginning or end necessarily involves questions of the finitude or not of 
time, and any answer they provide is unlikely to be convincing without a more thorough 
                                                             
53 Here, he is occasionally more rigorous than Smolin and Unger, who occasionally let their 
ambitions run ahead of what they can establish conclusively.  While this is occasionally 
admirable, one cannot avoid epistemic niceties exclusively by appealing to the grandiose.  
54 Ironically, I feel that this step, in keeping with the demands of practical reason, is closer to the spirit of 
Unger and Smolin’s project than simply dismissing the infinite wholesale.   
55 Penrose, The Road to Reality, 917 
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engagement with the infinite.   
Another question raised that is less directly obvious is how Unger and Smolin would 
relate their philosophy of nature to other scientifically and philosophically interesting 
phenomena.  This is important since a philosophy of nature must, by definition, account 
for all that naturally emerges. This means that Unger and Smolin must be able to extend 
the parameters of their thinking to account for features of the world like consciousness; 
the study of which draws in part from the mathematics of the infinite.  Ironically, in his 
Pragmatism Unbound,56 Unger references the linguistic theories of Noam Chomsky57  to 
give weight to his argument that human consciousness has a creative capacity to 
transcend social determination.  But Chomsky’s linguistics depends heavily on 
Cantorian insights about the infinite, particularly in his arguments about semantic 
novelty.  Chomsky believes that human consciousness can articulate a potentially infinite 
number of novel sentences, and analyses this using the tools provided by the mathematics 
of infinity.  This is also Penrose’s tactic in the more Gödel inspired work, The Emperor’s 
New Mind.58  Both these accounts of consciousness rely on mathematical insights about 
infinite to show how our mind is not entirely determined by external reality, and it is 
unclear how Unger can make a similar argument without relying on mathematical 
analogous tools.   
These points demonstrate that Unger and Smolin have inadequately addressed the 
problems posed by the infinite. This is especially problematic when a rigorous 
understanding is necessary if we are to account for how useful infinite quantities are 
becoming in understanding phenomena such as consciousness, language use, and to 
address antinomies about the origins of the universe.  Unger and Smolin ascribe the 
mathematical infinite far too little significance. I do not believe that this approach is 
appropriate given the magnitude of the problem.  That is why, in the subsequent sections, 
I will look at whether Schelling provides us with some of the philosophical resources we 
need to more rigorously approach these highly speculative problems. 
                                                             
56 Roberto Mangabeira Unger. The Self Awakened: Pragmatism Unbound. (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2009) 
57 Chomsky references Humboldt's quote in several different works.  See Chomsky. Language and 
Problems of Knowledge: The Manangua Lectures. (Boston: MIT Press, 1988).  Interestingly, Penrose 
makes a similar transcendental point (though he does not call it that) in his account of the creative 
aspect of the human mind, which allows it to grasp “Platonic” realities such as the infinite in a 
peculiar way. See Penrose. The Emperor’s New Mind 
58 Penrose, The Emperor’s New Mind 
 MATTHEW MCMANUS 251 
 
Part II 
STEPS TOWARDS A SCHELLINGIAN RECONCILIATION 
Thus far, I have argued that Roberto Unger and Lee Smolin developed an impressive 
and systematic philosophy of nature which is ultimately unconvincing.  This is due to 
their inadequate treatment of the infinite, and its application to understanding 
phenomena like the powers of human consciousness and certain classic problems about 
time and the origins of the universe.59   
This demonstrates the need to look for other philosophical resources to develop a 
more comprehensive philosophy of nature.  Schelling’s early and middle philosophy can 
offer many of the conceptual resources needed to resolve some of the problems 
highlighted above. This is because Schelling had a clear grasp on the paradoxes of the 
infinite, how consciousness attempts to mediate them, and how to reconcile these 
problems within a systematic philosophy of nature. 
This is not to suggest that the account given is a systematic application of Schelling’s 
work. Indeed, I approach his philosophy of nature with a fair degree of latitude. This is 
in part because it is often unclear how Schelling’s positions, expounded over several 
works, are meant to fit together.  Given this, approaching his work systematically would 
be unhelpful.  I think it is more useful to understand Schelling as wrestling with a 
consistent set of philosophical problems, rather than primarily developing a 
methodological approach which begets a specific set of philosophical solutions to be 
applied in all situations.  Schelling’s attempts to deal with diverse philosophical problems, 
and even the occasionally frustrating variety of answers he presents, can be extremely 
helpful in developing a philosophy of nature that avoids the problems which befall 
                                                             
59 In many respects, Unger and Smolin’s account falls victim to a problem that besets those 
ontologies which place absolute emphasis on contingency over necessity as animating principles 
in the formation of ontological structures.  A good contemporary example to place alongside 
Unger and Smolin’s philosophy of nature would be Quentin Meillassoux’s.  In his After Finitude, 
Meillassoux argues for an anti-Ptolemaic revolution in philosophy which would efface the impact 
of the Kantian revolution, and restore mathematics-contra Unger and Smolin-to pride of place 
as the language of ontology. Following Badiou, Meillassoux argues that a proper understanding 
of the mathematical structure of reality reveals the radical contingency of the all natural and even 
logical laws which emerge.  See Quentin Meillassoux. After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of 
Contingency, trans. Ray Brassier. (London, UK. Continuum, 2010)  
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proposals like Unger and Smolin’s. 
 Schelling’s early and mid period philosophy wrestles with two related problems.  
The first is to account for the nature of human consciousness. The second is to account 
for the system of nature which produced consciousness, 60 and to describe the relation 
between the two.61  These two problems can be presented as a paradox: while one can 
only understand nature through the tools of consciousness, at the same time, one cannot 
fully grasp the nature of consciousness without accounting for the natural world which 
produced it.62 
For our purposes, the latter is more important, as it is where Schelling provides the 
most useful philosophical resources for developing a robust philosophy of nature which 
goes beyond mere scientism.  As nicely summarized by Jared McGeough: 
“Nonetheless, the overall purpose of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie was less to 
explain how nature itself functioned than ‘to allow natural science itself to arise 
philosophically’ (Schelling, 1988: 5)—that is to say, to provide the philosophical or 
metaphysical framework through which the sciences are pushed beyond their own 
positivity.”63 
When discussing how Schelling “allows natural science itself to arise philosophically” it 
makes sense to begin by discussing his account of consciousness; the human organ which 
interacts with and apprehends scientific phenomena.  In his System of  Transcendental 
Idealism, Schelling develops a complex account of an infinite conscious “I” and how it 
relates to the world.  He maintains that consciousness is infinite because it comes to 
recognize its own status as Absolutely free through being able to will its own causality.  
Consciousness is able to bring novelty into the world in a manner that is not determined 
by anterior natural laws, and is thus a creative and free being.  This reconciles some of 
the antinomies posed between being a thinking subject and existing as a natural object.  
In Kantian terms,64 Schelling’s system of transcendental idealism shows us how infinite 
                                                             
60 See Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 219-233 and Schelling, First Outline, 193-194  
61 See Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 212-214 
62 My reading here draws in part, from Zizek’s comparison between Schelling and Heidegger on freedom 
and Being. See Slavoj Zizek. Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism. (London: Verso 
Press, 2012), 886-890.  According to Zizek, Heidegger saw Schelling as giving an account that moved 
beyond Kant’s transcendental schematic and enabling us to start asking questions on fundamental ontology. 
Of course, they came to radically different conclusions.  For Heidegger’s approach to these problems see 
Martin Heidegger. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics; Fifth Edition (Enlarged), trans. Richard Taft. (Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1997), 162-173. 
63 See Jared McGeough. “Three Scandals in the Philosophy of F. W. J. Schelling Ontology, Freedom, 
Mythology.” Anarchist Developments in Cultural Studies, 2, (2013), 146. 
64 See Immanuel Kant. Critique of Judgement, trans. James Creed Meredith. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007) 
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consciousness operates within historical times as a teleological unity between necessity 
and freedom through willing its own necessity.65   
But at this point, the infinite willing consciousness comes to recognize a problem.  
Despite the power it possesses through freedom, infinite consciousness remains 
constrained by its inability to explain the ground of its own individual being. Gradually, 
consciousness recognizes the reductive problem: it can only solve this problem by 
explaining the ground of all Being within time.  In the System of  Transcendental Idealism, 
Schelling felt that this reductive problem was insolvable, and that infinite consciousness 
could never grasp the even greater infinite nature which was beyond it. The best 
consciousness could do was to express these sublime thoughts in art, and therefore 
mediate the paradox of being a potentially infinite subject within the absolute infinite of 
nature.66  This somewhat proto-existential answer might superficially seem 
disappointing at first glance; especially for those of us interested in the philosophy of 
nature.  Fortunately, in his directly works on the philosophy of nature Schelling supplies 
us with useful philosophical tools to develop a more robust account of the ground of 
being.   
In nature Schelling confronts a problem comparable to that confronting infinite 
consciousness. This is that the beings of this world can only be accounted for by 
something both external to themselves in geometrical space, and prior to themselves 
within time. The ultimate grounding of Being Schelling called the Absolute.   How the 
Absolute was to be understood in Schelling remains a point of contention.67 But it seems 
clear that it is intended as something quite different from the stereotypical Hegelian 
Absolute Idea,68 where all differences become effaced in the unity of the one.69   Instead 
of existing as the teleological end-a unity in which all difference is effaced- from the start 
the Absolute is immanently alienated from itself.70   
I think the simplest way to characterize this alienation is as a struggle between 
necessity and contingency.  The Absolute operates according to a necessitarian and 
                                                             
65 See Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 203-211 
66 See Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 217-218 
67 For an interesting account see S.J McGrath. “Is Schelling’s Nature Philosophy Freudian?” Analecta 
Hermeneutica, 3, (2011) 
68 See Georg Hegel. Logic: Being Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, trans. William Wallace. 
(UK. Clarendon Press, 1975), 324 
69 Very few Hegelians still understand the Absolute in this way.  I do not think that is correct either. But to 
illuminate by contract I choose to raise the spectre of vulgar Hegelianism. 
70 This account is characteristic of Schelling’s thought, where natural antagonisms which confront one 
another engage in a productive set of relations which beget transformative processes, but are never resolved 
with any finality. This is in sharp contrast to vulgar Hegelianism.   
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eternal-one might say Platonic-logic, but struggles to elevate itself to a more conscious 
and free position by enacting contingent processes, par Unger and Smolin, within time.71 
Put more theosophically, for Schelling God as nature is immanently self-alienating, for 
it is self-alienation which is the most basic ground for the emergence of novelty. 
“In Schelling's Absolute there is a dark, irrational ground, which has to be purified, 
developmentally, ere Personal Being is reached; there is for him something in God 
which may, no doubt, become God, but is not God. God must have the ground of 
existence within himself, says Schelling, since nothing exists before or without God; 
but Schelling does not take this ground to be God, absolutely considered, that is to 
say, in so far as He exists. But if the world were taken, he says, to be different from 
God, then would the world have arisen from a ground different from God; but, as 
nothing can exist outside the Absolute, the solution of the contradiction is to be 
found, in his view, in the world having its ground in that original ground which is 
also the ground of the Divine Existence. This ground -or absolute potence -cannot 
be resolved, but remains as the ground, "the incomprehensible basis of reality."72 
Later, Schelling would go on to give this claim a more overtly moral73 cast in his 
profound analysis of human freedom.74 But in the early philosophy of nature, his 
treatment is more descriptive.  The Absolute comes into greater self-consciousness, and 
thus more power, through its process of self-alienation wherein the static necessity of 
natural determinism gives way to the contingency of what Schelling will famously call 
the potencies. 
This is how Schelling takes the natural world to have emerged as a dynamic process 
wherein individuated objects, and indeed conscious and free subjects, emerge out of a 
self-alienating Absolute unity.75  Over the course of time, the natural world comes to exist 
as instantiated sets of externalized relationships that are dynamic and open to contingent 
transformations in which novelty appears.  These instantiations of the Absolute as a set 
of dynamic relations Schelling called the “potencies.”76  The individual potencies which 
emerge in the world as instantiations of the Absolute ground of Being are each of equal 
ontological necessity, but within any given moment of time one potency may dominate 
                                                             
71 See Schelling, First Outline  
72 See James Lindsay. “The Philosophy of Schelling.” The Philosophical Review, 19, (1910), 267. 
73 Interestingly, Unger and Smolin are also prone to drawing moral inferences about human freedom from 
their account of nature.  As highlighted, there are clear connections drawn between overcoming false 
necessity in human social relations and recognizing the false necessity of determinate natural laws.  
74 See FWJ Schelling. Philosophical Investigations Into the Essence of Human Freedom, trans. Jeff Love 
and Johannes Schmidt. (Albany, NY. State University of New York Press, 2006) 
75 Schelling’s account of how objects emerge specifically remains somewhat vague to me. 
76 See Schelling, First Outline, 33. 
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or subsume a myriad of others through a transformative process. This creates emergent 
patterns within nature, wherein phenomena occur and time makes itself manifest to 
consciousness.  To invoke Unger and Smolin, these patterns will seem to assume a law 
governed character for consciousness, though the given legal regime lasts only so long as 
one potency is dominant.   
In his Philosophical Investigations Into the Essence of  Human Freedom, Schelling deepens 
many of these early claims while deviating from them in other important respects.  In 
the Philosophical Investigations Schelling attempts to show how the conscious subject 
recognizes that as nature itself is capable of  contingently generating novelty, so to are all 
human beings capable of freedom as a potentially infinite consciousness.77 This is in 
contrast to figures like Spinoza,78 who Schelling believes developed too static and 
deterministic an account of nature, consciousness, and the relation between them.79 
Schelling recognizes that the human being and nature share in the potentially infinite 
capacity to generate novelty in a manner which is grounded by necessity but cannot be 
explained or determined entirely by it.  This pushes the more inert aspect of an 
individuated potency back to instantiate itself in a dynamic process of engaging in 
transformative external relations.  In this way, potentially infinity capacity of nature’s 
potencies and human beings to generate novelty begets contingency in the world.  
But this comes at a price. The capacity to generate novelty is a potentially, rather 
than Absolutely, infinite capacity. This means that both conscious beings and the 
potencies of nature will always be engaged in an active process involving self-alienation 
through engaging in transformative external relations.80 There will never come a point 
when all infinite potentialities will be realized.  Human beings and nature will never 
reach a state of perfection in an inalienable Absolute where all potencies come to rest in 
static harmony with one another.81 Various potencies may well dominate nature at given 
times, as various drives may dominate the consciousness of human beings. But none will 
ever subordinate all other potentially infinite potentialities for the rest eternity.  Indeed, 
                                                             
77 Later, he seems to further humanize this intuition by ascribing an approximate function to human 
mythology.  I do not feel he was correct to take this step.  See F.W.J Schelling. Historical-critical Introduction to 
the Philosophy of Mythology, trans. Mason Richey and Markus Zisselsberger. (New York: State University of 
New York Press, 2007) 
78 See Benedict de Spinoza. Ethics, trans. Edwin Curley. (London, UK. Penguin Books, 2005) 
79 See Schelling. “Philosophical Investigations,” 12-13. 
80 There are some senses here in which potentiality seems to have a kind of virtual existence.  I will develop 
this point further in the last section. 
81 As noted by McGeough, this might well be interpreted in radical political directions. See 
McGeough “Three Scandals in the Philosophy of F. W. J. Schelling Ontology, Freedom, 
Mythology.”  
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Schelling seems to regard such a possibility as tantamount to death. 
I hope the reader can see the attractions of this line of argument.  Schelling’s thought 
enables us to think through the links between the potentially infinite consciousness of the 
subject and their relationship with an Absolute infinite nature that manifests itself as 
potencies.  Moreover, Schelling’s thought helps us see how nature can consist of 
potencies which simultaneously generate regular natural laws at any one moment while 
a given potency is dominate, while the interplay of all potencies over time produces real 
change.  I believe this retains the best features of Roberto Unger and Lee Smolin’s 
philosophy of nature while going beyond it in important ways.  It relies heavily on a 
transcendental account of infinite quantities, and ascribes them actual ontological 
significance.82  In this way it keeps aspects of the Platonic emphasis on mathematics that 
are valuable.  But at the same time Schelling’s philosophy of nature does not relegate the 
actual operations of nature to the ephemeral realm of illusion, while focusing exclusively 
on the operation of eternal laws.  It therefore addresses Unger and Smolin’s concerns 
about physicists and natural philosophers focusing excessively on the eternal rather than 
the temporal. 
To put it in the language of Unger and Smolin, Schelling believes that time does exist 
in the strong sense of the word.  This is because nature’s laws do evolve and transform 
through the interplay of potencies.  But where Schelling goes beyond Unger and Smolin 
is his argument that even such a non-totalizing vision is dependent on considering the 
ground of all nature itself, an Absolute infinite that remains in contradiction to our 
existential experience of reality.83 The process of this Absolute is to be continuously self-
alienating, wherein the instantiation of potencies results in their coming into relation 
with one another and generating novel patterns in nature. There is no point where nature 
ceases to be a process and becomes holistically one again with its fundamental Idea84 in 
the Absolute. The Absolute immanently constitutes nature through self-alienation, and 
nature in turn enables the deeper development of the absolute.  It is the task of 
philosophers to think through these complex features of the philosophy of nature without 
reducing either the itself without reducing nature to its mere appearances. A philosophy 
of nature must be far more sensitive to the richer and deeper process which occurs 
beneath the superficial sheen of such appearances.  
This concludes my brief discussion of Schelling’s philosophy of nature.  I believe that 
there is much which can be profitably mined from these speculations.  However, as it 
                                                             
82 See Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 155.  Here Schelling discusses how the self becomes open to 
the infinity that is its creative freedom within nature. 
83 See Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 215-218 
84 The language here is Hegelian.  See Hegel. Logic, 392. 
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stands now, their contemporary application remains unclear.  While Unger and Smolin 
have elaborated on the relationship of their philosophy of nature and contemporary 
physics, Schelling wrote centuries ago and much work remains to be done in updating 
and applying his philosophy to contemporary problems. In the concluding section, I will 
present a reconstruction of the Schellingian ideas presented here alongside some of my 
own.  I will also suggest how these either supplement or run counter to those presented 
by Unger and Smolin.  
CONCLUSION: GOING BEYOND SCHELLING  
In this paper we have looked at two philosophies of nature: the contemporary proposal 
developed by Unger and Smolin and presented in The Singular Universe, and Schelling’s 
eclectic philosophy of nature as presented in multiple different works.  I argued that, for 
all its innovations, Unger and Smolin’s philosophy of nature was beset with significant 
problems, especially its treatment of the infinite.  By contrast, Schelling’s does not suffer 
from the same deficiencies, and offers a rich set of philosophical resources to develop a 
more robust philosophy of nature.   
In this concluding section, I will try to develop this position more programmatically.  
The key point I wish to highlight is the relationship and tension Schelling draws between 
an infinite conscious being and the even more infinite world that exists beyond it.  This 
point is the source or rich philosophical insight for Schelling, and maps neatly onto 
Cantor’s distinction between the potential and the Absolute infinite; with the former 
operating as a continuum and the latter serving a more or less religious function 
analogous to the Absolute in classical thought.  Unger and Smolin are mostly dismissive 
of these issues due to their anti-Platonism. Following Schelling, I think there is a lot more 
to be gleaned here than meets the eye.  
There are two natural phenomena Schelling is better able to account for which 
demonstrate the power of his system relative to Unger and Smolin’s.  These relate back 
to the two problems he was concerned to deal with throughout his philosophy.  The first 
is the problem of an infinite consciousness and its relationship with nature.  The second 
is the problem of nature itself. 
 To the first, I think that Schelling’s philosophy of nature gives us a far more robust 
understanding of the power and nature of consciousness than would be possible on 
Unger and Smolin’s proposal.  Schelling understands human beings to be novelty 
generating; they bring contingency into the world.  As highlighted before, there seem to 
be good reasons to believe this is indeed what human beings do.  A good example is the 
way we continuously generate sentences which are semantically novel and have never 
been articulated in the world before. This is referred to as semantic novelty by Noam 
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Chomsky. 
 Chomsky has often approvingly cited Humboldt's claim that language involves the 
"infinite use of finite means."85  To understand how this is so, one must momentarily turn 
back to Cantor's logical argument about the potential infinite, which formed the basis 
for Chomsky's own investigations into the logical structure of what he later referred to as 
generative grammar. Chomsky relied on Cantor's discoveries to demonstrate how a 
language could both be indefinitely capable of new growth while at the same time never 
reaching a point where one could speak of a set of all possible statements. It also helped 
explain how individuals can continue to deploy language creatively even in semantic 
communities with long histories or limited members. Chomsky's discovery constitutes 
the corollary of Cantor's own pioneering discoveries.  
The logic of Cantorian mathematics was foundational to Chomsky's project. 
Chomsky argued that empiricist theories of language could not account for how 
languages grow and evolve; how novelty can emerge in other words.86 Chomsky argued 
that languages change because most statements, (excepting certain colloquialisms such 
as hello and goodbye), are semantically novel. This means that they have never been 
made by a speaker before. Chomsky claims that the semantic novelty of most statements 
results from what he calls the "creative aspect of language." The creative aspect of a 
language demonstrates how individuals continuously invent and play new "games" with 
their semantic inheritances.  
Chomsky’s account of the semantic novelty echoes Schelling’s far earlier accounts of 
an infinite consciousness interacting with an even larger world.  Notably, Schelling saw 
this interaction as a productive one that never reached a conclusion.  As mentioned, 
consciousness always possesses the potentially infinite capacity to bring about novelty, 
but never reaches a point where full reconciliation with the Absolute takes place. In the 
same way, Chomsky demonstrates how language users will continuously produce an 
endless variety of novel sentences without ever exhausting or running up against the 
limits of their language.  There will always be something new to say, and our 
consciousness and engagement with the world ensures that we will always take advantage 
of this. 
This brings me to the second point I would like to make about the explanatory power 
of Schelling’s philosophy of nature.  Schelling provides the theoretical resources to better 
understand a conscious human being’s potentially infinite capacity to bring novelty into 
                                                             
85 Chomsky references Humboldt's quote in several different works. See Chomsky. Language, 213 
86 Contra Unger and Smolin, Chomsky also refers to this as a Platonic idea. See Noam Chomsky. Selected 
Readings on Transformational Theory. (London, UK: Dover Books, 2009), 135. 
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the world. But I think we can follow him further and apply this insight more 
comprehensively to nature itself.  This is where Schelling can better enable us to develop 
a more robust and modern philosophy of nature.  In much the same way as consciousness 
has an infinite capacity to generate novelty, so to do nature’s potencies continuously 
relate to one another and bring about novel physical phenomena; including novel 
physical laws.  But, for Schelling, this process is itself determined by a deeper relationship 
to the Absolute which is analogous to the relationship Cantor drew between the potential 
and the Absolute infinite.   
I think the best way to understand and update Schelling’s proposals on the 
philosophy of nature is to see nature as he did; fundamentally complete in one respect 
but self-alienating in another.  I do this by dividing nature into two fundamental 
dimensions, which mostly correspond to Schelling’s Absolute and the natural world 
established by the interaction of the potencies. These two dimensions interact with one 
another through a transformative process wherein the eternal infinite laws of 
mathematics beget novel features and laws in nature. 
To put this in updated terminology we might call the first dimension of reality the 
Absolute infinite.  This Absolute infinite is the eternal set of all possible instantiations of 
the potencies of nature which might potentially emerge in the transformational process 
of novelty generation over time.87 It operates according to a Platonic logic88 determined 
by the mathematical rules sketched out by Cantor, and reintroduced to continental 
philosophers by Badiou and Meillasoux amongst other thinkers.89  But it is important to 
note that its existence is virtual, in the sense that it is purely the set of all possible 
instantiations.  The Platonic logic does not determine which instantiations will appear 
since this is dependent on the interactive process the potencies engage in over time.   
Then there is the dimension of potentiality.  There are the potentially infinite 
number of instantiations which do occur in concrete fact, and which constitute the 
sequence of events we perceive in real time.  These instantiations have a virtual existence 
as potential material events within the eternal set of all possibilities, until the contingent 
relation of potencies instantiate in a particular way as concrete, novel events in the world 
of time.  As these material events unfurl, we come to perceive the succession of them as 
“time.” The process moves us from the Absolute infinite set determined by a Platonic 
                                                             
87 Following Bohm, we might call this a theory of an implicate order, which explicates itself in the course of 
time. See David Bohm. Wholeness and the Implicate Order. (London, UK. Routeledge Press, 1980).  Unlike 
Bohm however, I do not think reality is a “whole” in the sense of being Absolutely complete. This is where 
the distinction between dimensions, inspired by Schelling, becomes important.  
88 This echoes Penrose’s point.  See Penrose. The Road to Reality, 1028-1029. 
89 See Badiou. Being and Event, and Meillasoux, After Finitude  
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logic of mathematical rules, to the virtual realm of potential events, and finally events 
which occur in concrete fact as natural potencies relate in novel ways.  Throughout the 
process, the level of sophistication and complexity in nature continuously increases in a 
manner analogous to how consciousness generates novel sentences which enrich a 
language.  
Following Schelling, and indeed Unger and Smolin on this point, I think it is 
important to highlight that this process is never ending and open ended.  Novelty is 
continuously being introduced into the world, sometimes in the form of novel physical 
laws.  But where Schelling is more sophisticated than Unger and Smolin is in the 
dynamic nature of his natural ontology.  He recognizes that there are what I have called 
multiple dimensions to reality, such as the alienated Absolute and its potencies, rather 
than trying to reduce it to a kind of ontological univocity par Unger and Smolin.  I’ve 
chosen to update Schelling’s account here by casting it in terms of an Absolute and 
potential infinite, which are two interactive dimensions of reality.  I feel such a 
Schellingian account offers a more robust philosophy of nature than can be found in the 
work of Smolin and Unger, though it draws on their more important insights.  
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